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Accounting for the Specious Present: A Defense of Enactivism 
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I argue that conscious visual experience is essentially a non-representational demonstration of 
a skill. The explication and defense of this position depends on both phenomenological and 
empirical considerations. The central phenomenological claim is this: as a matter of human 
psychology, it is impossible to produce a conscious visual experience of a mind-independent 
object that is sufficiently like typical cases, without including concomitant proprioceptive sen-
sations of the sort of extra-neural behavior that allows us to there and then competently detect 
such objects. I then argue that this view, which is a version of enactivism, best explains the tem-
porality of conscious experience — what is often called the specious present.  
Keywords: visual experience, enactivism, specious present, consciousness
We are living organisms that continuously engage in a dynamic, embodied 
coupling with our environment. Does this truism tell us anything essential about 
human perceptual experience?  
There is a very well-entrenched position regarding the relationship between 
perception, cognition, and action that says: “No.” Following Susan Hurley (1998), 
I will call it the classical sandwich. This is the input–processing–output way of 
understanding the relationship between perceptual experience, cognition, and 
action, respectively. It construes conscious visual experiences, for example, as the 
upstream causal inputs that are only later cognitively processed in a way that facili- 
tates appropriate action as an output. To simplify the discussion that follows, and 
also because it represents the dominant version of the view, I will henceforth use 
a certain admittedly roughly hewn version of naturalized functionalism as my 
working example of the classical sandwich.1 On such a view, we can understand 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kaplan Hasanoglu, Ph.D., Philosophy 
Department, Emmanuel College, 400 The Fenway, ADM 357, Boston, Massachusetts 02115. Email: 
hasanogluk@emmanuel.edu
1 Other, currently less popular versions of the classical sandwich include a sense-data theory, adverbia- 
lism, and certain characterizations of direct realism. I will not discuss the merits or faults of these 
positions here. 
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conscious visual experiences, for example, as representations that are the emer-
gent computational result of the activation of a dedicated set of neural pathways; 
namely, those that reliably respond to the observable shape, color, and motion 
properties of nearby objects. This version of the classical sandwich acknowledges 
the obvious point that conscious visual experiences typically cause, result from, 
and coincide with extra-neural bodily acts. But this, along with the above truism, 
only points us towards how visual experience is contingently developed and 
causally influenced by one’s body and surroundings. According to the classical 
sandwich, this must be distinguished from its essential computational properties 
as an input for downstream cognition and action.2
In this paper, I will explicate and defend a view that denies the more traditional 
view. The position I defend is a form of enactivism.3 In my view, everyday visual 
experience is something we act out; it is a demonstration of a kind of know-how. 
This resembles the views of so-called sensorimotor enactivists. Alva Noë, for exam-
ple, maintains that to consciously visually experience an object just is to demonstrate 
one’s mastery of its relevant sensorimotor profile; that is, of how one’s bodily move-
ments (would) correspond with certain characteristic changes in relevant sensory 
stimulations.4 According to Noë, as I understand him, our habituated interactions 
with our surroundings not only shape how such mastery develops, but also how 
mastery manifests itself on a particular occasion. To visually experience something 
on a particular occasion just is to act out or demonstrate this so-developed mastery 
of the relevant sensorimotor contingencies. Thus, in Noë’s view: “perception is not 
something that happens to us or in us, but instead is something we do” (2004, p. 1). 
In the next section, with a focus on conscious visual experience, I will both 
introduce and provisionally defend my own version of enactivism. I will then go 
on to argue for its explanatory superiority in accounting for the specious present, 
which is a relatively standard term for the structural way we consciously experience 
time. Thus, a methodological point is in order. In what follows, one assumption is 
that if the classical sandwich were true, a certain version of it would provide the 
most plausible explanation of certain structural (that is, ubiquitous and suitably 
2 This is sometimes expressed as the claim that extra-neural bodily actions and skills cause but do 
not constitute actual visual experience. For defenses of this idea, framed as criticisms of the sort of 
sensorimotor enactivism I discuss below, see Block (2005); Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2008); and 
Aizawa (2010).  
3 Enactivist views vary significantly. The modern forms of the view stem from Varela, Thompson, and 
Rosch (1991). However, the basic idea can be traced back to a certain interpretation of Heidegger 
(1929/1962); as well as to Husserl (1954/1970, 1968/1997); Merleau–Ponty (1945/1962); and Dewey 
(1896), among others. Prominent defenses of sensorimotor enactivism, which I briefly discuss, include: 
Noë (2004, 2009); O’Regan and Noë (2001); O’Regan (2011); and Hurley (1998). Other versions of 
enactivism are also defended, for example, in Thompson (2007) and Hutto and Myin (2012). For a nice 
overview of the popular varieties of enactivism, see Ward, Silverman, and Villalobos (2017).   
4 For example, we implicitly know that a coin sitting on a table will gradually appear larger and more 
circular in shape as we approach it from the side.
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generic) features of ordinary first-person conscious visual experiences of the mind- 
independent world. On the other hand, I shall assume that if these same features can 
be more plausibly explained by the sort of enactivism I articulate below, this thereby 
provides defeasible reasons for adopting it over other views. So, the more general 
question that is only partially addressed in this paper is whether phenomenology 
can aide in telling us whether my version of enactivism or else some variant of the 
more traditional alternative holds for everyday cases of consciously experiencing 
the mind-independent world.5 (I will not here address the admittedly important 
matter of how enactivism might account for hallucinations and/or illusions.)
Some will question this methodology. For example, many theorists have denied 
that we should reference the first-person perspective for data if we are genuinely 
trying to understand human cognition. But, although here I cannot adequately 
address why this worry is mistaken, thankfully I am not alone in seeing phenomeno- 
logy as a rigorous and potentially fruitful methodology for studying the mind.6 In 
tandem with some relevant empirical considerations, I hope to put it to good use 
in the discussion that follows.  
The Enactivist Approach 
In this section, I will both explain and provisionally argue for a certain version 
of enactivism. My aim here is primarily expository, with the hope of preliminarily 
sharpening the debate. The idea is to set the stage for the main arguments offered 
in the next section. 
Let’s call the Good Case a relatively globally understood situation involving a typ-
ical adult’s bodily interactions with her surrounding environment, including but not 
limited to conscious visual experiences of aspects of that environment. According to 
enactivism, in Good Cases, consciously visually experiencing our surroundings is 
just one of many skills that we are then deploying. In particular, it is a demonstration 
of a practical mastery of a certain dynamic and continuous process of interacting 
with one’s surroundings. As I shall understand it, a dynamic process is one that 
systematically evolves in real time, in a way that reflects the interdependent rela-
tionship between its components (Port and van Gelder, 1995, Ch. 1).7 Consider 
5 Here and throughout I will be using the term “phenomenological” in the general Husserlian sense 
that relates to a careful, first-person examination of what it is like to experience the world, and any 
related conclusions. For discussion of the relationship between phenomenology, so understood, 
and cognitive science, see Petitot, Varela, Pachoud, and Roy (1999); Gallagher (2005); Gallagher 
and Zahavi (2012); and Thompson (2007). 
6 See previous footnote. In short, the mistake involves conflating a careful phenomenological investi- 
gation with a kind of free-wheeling introspectionism. For a brief but helpful discussion of the differ- 
ence, see Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, pp. 16–49). 
7 The properties of such systems are the focus of dynamic systems theory. For a general discussion of 
dynamic systems theory and how it can inform cognitive science in a way that potentially challenges 
a more traditional, computationalist approach, see Port and van Gelder (1995).
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weightlifting. Suppose we wish to capture what is going on when one does a set of 
bicep curls to exhaustion. Typically, one would start off doing the repetitions in a 
rhythmically patterned, relatively uniform manner. But as one’s muscles become 
exhausted, the rhythm slows, and the successive repetitions become more and more 
dissimilar to one another. In other words, one’s performance degrades over time, 
and the relevant point at the moment is that referencing how this action is mani-
fested in real time puts one in a much better position to understand why and how it 
degrades. To instead describe a dynamic process like this in a way that is abstracted 
from its real time performance — as, say, just a set of twenty bicep curls — would, if 
nothing else, present an incomplete picture of matters. For example, it would neces-
sarily gloss over certain important differences between two distinct performances, 
such as those related to timing. (Suppose the first set took longer than the second.) 
Next, by continuous, I mean a dynamic process of a sort where the behavior 
of the components evolves in both a simultaneous and analog fashion. For this 
reason, it is at best unnecessary to here pick out temporally asymmetric inputs 
versus outputs, causes versus effects, etc. Consider, once again, an individual repe- 
tition of a bicep curl. When everything is going as expected, such a performance 
involves an interdependent relationship between the smoothly flowing (rather 
than discrete-step-involving) movements of one’s muscles and limbs, and the simi- 
larly analog movement of the dumbbell. When engaged in this skillful activity, it 
is the analog limb movements that cause the analog dumbbell movements, which 
simultaneously cause the analog limb movements, etc.  Mid-repetition, it would 
simply be wrong to assign an asymmetric temporal order to the process of limb 
versus dumbbell movement: it is not as if, say, first one’s arm moves and then the 
dumbbell moves, or vice versa. Rather, by that time, both are already behaving in 
an analog, simultaneously interdependent way. 
Finally, if we want to capture the skillful nature of a dumbbell repetition, we 
can’t simply talk about the continuous relationships it involves. (Consider that 
the celestial bodies found in our solar system exhibit the same kind of relation-
ship.) Briefly, to exhibit a skill is to demonstrate one’s practical mastery of a 
relevant abstract space: namely, the space of possible continuous relationships 
between one’s bodily movements and the surrounding world. One demonstrates 
such mastery by navigating through the world in a way that amounts, more pre-
cisely, to navigating through that abstract space. The point is Gibsonian: it can 
be well-enough described using his famous concept of an affordance (Gibson, 
1986; see also Chemero, 2003). So, in the relevant Good Case, when I lift a 
dumbbell I demonstrate my practical mastery of the more general fact that it 
affords lifting. In order for this to occur, the dumbbell and my body must have a 
certain kind of physical structure and overall functionality that makes this along 
with many other interactions possible. Moreover, as an active bodily movement, 
any such demonstration is affect and/or impulse-driven — what I will hence-
forth call desiderative. In Good Cases, I skillfully navigate through the relevant 
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space of possibilities because, trivially, I desire that particular interaction at that 
time. I then lift the dumbbell because I then desire to finish that set. The desire 
(affect, impulse, etc.) is thus both what initiates and also what helps to sustain 
the relevant behavior. If it weren’t in place, I would either not lift at all, or else 
give up halfway through.
It is important to emphasize how in such cases one demonstrates a mastery 
of possible continuous relationships. Mid-skillful-repetition, it is not as if I then 
merely demonstrate a practical mastery of how moving in a certain way accom-
plishes (full stop) a certain desirable interaction with the dumbbell. Nor is it a 
case where I demonstrate how having accomplished (full stop) a certain desirable 
interaction now makes a certain finite set of possible subsequent bodily move-
ments optimal, given what I desire. This is not the right way to look at things 
because, mid-repetition, there is no full stop accomplishment. Instead, the action 
is a constantly ongoing, fundamentally analog demonstration of my mastery of 
how certain bodily movements and dumbbell affordances are, more generally 
speaking, simultaneously interdependent.   
I am now in a position to make a crucial phenomenological point — one 
that will eventually help to distinguish my version of enactivism from other 
positions, including more traditional views. Namely, as desiderative bodily 
interactions of living organisms, such skillful demonstrations are essentially 
proprioceptive. As a different example, consider the act of keeping your arm 
extended out in front of you while your eyes are closed. This ongoing process 
is both a case where a certain desirable behavior is what you proprioceptively 
sense; as well as, simultaneously and interdependently, one where what you 
thus sense determines optimal behavior. One here engages in self-aware (i.e., 
proprioceptive) sense-acting — the hallmark of skillful behavior. For dumbbell 
repetitions, a form of proprioceptive awareness is of course equally essential.  I 
demonstrate a mastery of a skill in this case, only because I have at that time a 
kinesthetic sense of how my body is then desirably moving; a sense that itself 
helps to determine optimal movement. Of course, in this case, along with 
proprioceptive awareness, the interaction with the dumbbell also helps to pro-
duce the relevant movement. It follows that certain properties of the dumbbell 
(rather than just of my hand and arm position) help to cause the movement. 
However, in order for this to be a typical skillful act, the conscious detection of 
such properties must be coincident with the relevant conscious proprioceptive 
awareness.8 This is for a very straightforward reason: living organisms will typ-
8 I am, frankly, unsure of the force of this “must.” I am certainly prepared to present it as a strong 
claim about human psychology. However, at least in this paper, I will leave open whether it should 
be taken in a more robust sense. Thus, at least for the purposes of the present discussion, I would 
be happy to admit that my position is compatible with, say, the metaphysical possibility that things 
are otherwise. 
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ically consciously sense the dumbbell’s properties with their feeling bodies. (Of 
course, that a living, feeling body is typically involved also explains why skillful 
behaviors are fundamentally desiderative.)9   
A similar story can be told for skillful actions involving surrounding objects 
that, unlike dumbbells, are not themselves moved by one’s body. Generally speak-
ing, perhaps the most ubiquitous “object” of this sort will be the room in which 
one finds oneself, or else the surrounding outdoor space. For example, if nothing 
else, to walk into a room is to interact with the floor in a skillful way. So, in the 
relevant Good Case, while walking I competently navigate through an abstract 
space of possible interactions peculiar to my body and the floor. This is clearly the 
result of the fact that both the floor and my body have a certain kind of structure 
and functionality that facilitates this happy coupling. Furthermore, this skillful 
action can only be accomplished because I have a feeling body that desires that 
interaction and also consciously detects both the relevant properties of the floor, 
as well as the changing position of my body.10  
The point arguably generalizes to all Good Cases. Notice that, typically, 
although we are not always walking and/or working out, we are seemingly 
always in the middle of demonstrating some sort of skillful bodily interac-
tion with respect to our surroundings. Whenever we are conscious, we do not 
simply detect certain aspects of our surroundings, but also necessarily simulta-
neously proprioceptively sense our feeling body as it interacts with those same 
surroundings. Therefore, teleologically, consciousness exists for the following 
reason: for living organisms like us it is instrumental for achieving the desirable, 
sometimes even rather pressing aims of the moment. Consciousness is, then, 
indispensably purpose-driven; and, in that sense, action-oriented. In short, 
being conscious keeps us alive. According to enactivism, and in stark contrast 
with the classical sandwich, this telos is essential to consciousness.  
 I am now poised to articulate the central claim of this section, which is that in 
a Good Case visual experience is just another example of an indispensably deside- 
rative and proprioceptive interaction with the surrounding world. In various rele-
vant respects, visual experience is no different from walking or working out.11 To 
9 For useful recent discussions of the intimate connection between living, desiring, and conscious 
experience, see Maiese (2011, 2016).
10 The same basic idea could be applied to any present, relevantly significant physical force. For 
example, when holding one's hand out in front of oneself, although one is not touching any object, 
one there and then interacts with the force of gravity.
11 This is essentially Merleau–Ponty’s view. He claimed that motor intentionality is the primary mode 
of conscious visual experience. The way we engage the world consciously is not via a process describ-
able as “I think,” (or, in more modern terms, “I represent that…”) but rather, “I can” (Merleau–Ponty, 
1945/1962, p. 137). Following ideas that stem from a certain reading of Heidegger, the basic idea is 
that visual experience is first and foremost a pre-reflective practical rather than cognitive (represen-
tational) engagement. 
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visually experience an object in a Good Case is to competently navigate through an 
abstract space of possible relationships between behaviors of my eyes, head, neck, 
etc. — what I will henceforth call visual behavior — and certain affordances of 
nearby objects. Whenever you visually experience something in a Good Case, your 
body is constantly accomplishing something. When an attractive person walks into 
the room, visual behavior helps you glance at them — they catch your eye. When 
a ball flies in one’s direction, visual behavior helps you keep it centered in your 
visual field as you track its movement. When I’m trying to find my keys, visual 
behavior helps me home in on their position on the table in front of me. Generally 
speaking, then, visual behavior helps me accomplish the task of remotely detecting 
various (properties of) objects. Visual behavior does this only because such objects 
have properties that afford remote detection. In Good Cases, visual experience 
thus bears all the hallmarks of a skill. Arguably, it is essentially nothing more or 
less than desiderative, self-aware sense-acting. I only engage in visual behavior in 
Good Cases because it is in some sense desirable to do so. Moreover, the conscious 
detection of, say, an object’s color will always there and then include proprioceptive 
awareness of visual behavior. As you read this you will notice that you simulta-
neously feel how your eyes are open and scanning the page, how your head and 
neck are oriented in a certain way, etc. So, as I want to understand the position, the 
distinctively enactivist phenomenological claim with respect to visual experience 
is this: living organisms like us could not consciously visually experience actual 
nearby objects in a normal-seeming way, unless we also had at that very instant an 
equally conscious proprioceptive awareness of the skillful visual behavior required 
to detect those same objects. This view would be falsified if it were shown to be 
psychologically possible to produce a visual experience of an actual object that 
was sufficiently intrinsically similar in its visual phenomenal quality to the one 
you are now enjoying, without producing both forms of consciously accessible 
sensations. According to enactivism, you simply cannot, even in some idealized 
yet still informative sense, “factor out” the relevant kind of proprioception and still 
visually experience the world in the way that you now do (see footnote 8 above). 
Arguably, if one is tempted to call the possession of this competency a kind 
knowledge, then that is only because it evinces a living animal’s disposition to reliably 
accomplish a certain desirable project. But notice that even a bacterium demonstrates 
the possession of such “knowledge” when it competently swims towards sucrose.12 
(Needless to say, a proponent of the classical sandwich would wish to here highlight 
certain important differences between our behavior and that of a bacterium. I address 
this below, when I discuss the role that representations can play in our actions.) 
Of course, in many respects, vision is quite different from the cases discussed 
above. For one thing, your eyes do not actually physically touch the objects seen, 
12 The example of a bacterium swimming towards sucrose is taken from Thompson (2007, p. 154). 
However, he there uses it to make a somewhat different point.  
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whereas your feet touch the floor, your hands touch the dumbbell, etc. In that 
sense, although it is true that the object indirectly does something physically 
to your eyes and visual system, visual behavior does not involve direct physical 
contact with the surface of a seen object. Nevertheless, although my eyes don’t 
physically do anything to the objects I see, proprioceptive awareness of the rele-
vant skillful behavior allows for something much more fundamentally important: 
it allows my eyes to physically do something to the project of remotely detecting 
an object’s properties. Proprioceptive awareness perpetually helps me continue to 
competently accomplish that desirable project. Also, simultaneously, accomplish-
ing that project by way of the physical movements involved does something to my 
feeling body. Namely, it shapes optimal skillful visual behavior.  
However, one thing to notice is that, because only remote detection is involved, 
optimal skillful visual behavior is usually going to be much more open-ended than 
optimal manual or pedal behavior. If I’m trying to lift a dumbbell, for example, 
there is a relatively narrow set of optimal behaviors that will help me do so — I 
can’t, say, lift it with just my little finger. That’s not the way that a competent weight-
lifter navigates through the relevant space of possibilities. By contrast, if all I am 
trying to do is remotely detect an object and/or its properties, I can do so with a 
relatively open-ended range of visual behaviors. 
In response, a certain proponent of the more traditional view can admit that, 
in Good Cases, consciousness is purposeful in the ways I’ve been highlighting. 
But it simply does not follow that consciousness is essentially purposeful. To lend 
plausibility to the classical sandwich — a view that divorces what is essential to 
visual experience from purposeful action in the ways mentioned earlier — this 
imagined objector might argue that the experimentally confirmed modularity 
of the neurological processing responsible for remotely detecting form, color, 
motion, etc., shows clearly enough how visual experience is functionally indepen-
dent from both proprioception and affect/impulse. A large amount of evidence 
suggests that we detect such properties via neural pathways that run from the 
retina to relatively specific areas of the visual cortex and beyond, in a way that 
can be meaningfully neurophysiologically distinguished from the pathways that 
subserve either proprioception or affect/impulse. So, although in Good Cases a 
conscious visual experience of an object is indeed simultaneous with and causally 
(including evolutionarily and developmentally) related to skillful visual behavior, 
the former is still functionally autonomous with respect to the latter.13 If so, then 
13 Some have argued on behalf of more traditional views that neuroscientific data cause serious trouble 
for sensorimotor enactivism, in particular. Namely, experimental results suggest that the processing 
responsible for conscious visual experience is functionally distinct from the processing responsible for 
the sort of vision that subserves manual motor tasks like reaching and grasping. For an overview of 
this so-called dual-visual systems hypothesis, and a discussion of the extent to which it causes a prob-
lem for sensorimotor enactivism, see Gangopadhyay, Madary, and Spicer (2010). One of the virtues 
of my position is that it straightforwardly avoids this problem. (This is not to say, however, that there 
aren’t other empirical results that might present a different challenge.) 
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even in a Good Case it would be quite proper to construe visual experiences as 
essentially quite distinct from both simultaneous skillful extra-neural bodily acts, 
as well as any desires that initiate and help to sustain those acts. Notice that if this 
position is defensible, it would allow one to go on to defend the more traditional 
view that visual consciousness’s essential role is that of an input for downstream 
cognition and action. 
Needless to say, I will not here attempt to decide this debate once and for all. 
Instead, I will spend the rest of the paper offering a particular phenomenologically 
and empirically informed argument for enactivism. 
The Specious Present
Ordinary experiences of mind-independent reality have a phenomenologi-
cally irreducible temporal width. When we visually experience our surroundings, 
for example, we typically not only consciously and pre-reflectively retain what 
we have just experienced at least a second or two earlier; we also consciously and 
pre-reflectively anticipate, or — to use the Husserlian term of art — protend what 
is about to happen. The specious present is the term often used for the entire span 
of time that includes what we retain, instantaneously enjoy, as well as protend.14 
As I now gaze at my computer, for example, I both have a conscious pre-reflective 
sense of the way it looked to me at least a few seconds earlier, as well as a conscious 
pre-reflective anticipation regarding how it is going to look to me in the upcoming 
moments. 
Henceforth, for simplicity, I would like to focus on the following extremely 
common class of Good Cases: those where one pays unreflective visual attention 
to a nearby object or set of objects. For the remainder of the paper, I will argue 
that enactivism best explains the specious present in these cases, in particular.15 
There is a paradoxical flavor to the specious present. On the one hand, it is 
not odd to suggest that we have a conscious sense of the way something looks at 
a certain instant. But how can an object’s immediate past and anticipated states 
also be something of which we are then pre-reflectively conscious? For example, 
how can I be conscious of a past state that isn’t there anymore? Notice that it 
would be wrong to think of this sort of retention as a form of recollection (Husserl, 
1964/1928, p. 41; Varela, 1999, pp. 279–280). My computer’s just past color is not 
something that I retain in the same way that I recall what I ate for breakfast yes-
terday. There is a perception-like immediacy of the just past color of my computer 
that isn’t true of yesterday’s breakfast, nor my recollection of it. An air of paradox 
14 For useful discussion of how the specious present relates to an embodied understanding of the 
mind, see Zahavi (2005). See also Gallagher (2005). 
15 For arguments for the claim that certain versions of enactivism best explain the specious present, 
see van Gelder (1999); Varela (1999); and Thompson (2007, pp. 312–359).
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thus surrounds how an object’s just past states are something of which I can still 
be conscious at a present instant. How and why is it that the conscious sense I have 
of something at a certain moment leaves a noticeable phenomenological residue 
in subsequent experiences; a residue that is only gradually washed away?16 A par-
allel puzzle applies to an object’s protended future states. As with retention, this 
anticipating is not the result of a noticeably separate conscious act — it would be 
wrong to construe protending along the lines of something like hoping, fearing, 
or predicting what’s going to happen later on in the evening. How, then, can I 
already be in some sense immediately conscious of an object’s potential future 
states, before any of them happen? This might seem even more paradoxical. 
 Notice, also, that in the cases under examination, the same paradoxical flavor 
can be found in how you experience your body while you visually experience the 
world. When gazing at an object in the relevant cases, you also simultaneously and 
pre-reflectively have a background proprioceptive sense of both the just past and 
current relative comportment of the various body parts involved in visual behav-
ior. Moreover, you pre-reflectively anticipate your subsequent bodily position to 
be a certain way, depending upon your familiarity with both what you are then 
doing, and more generally capable of doing.17 
In sum, as I shall put it, as visually experiencing subjects, we continuously live 
through the specious present in a manner that is phenomenologically irreducible. 
By phenomenologically irreducible, I simply mean that there is nothing more basic 
than the felt body-and-world-involving specious present, as far as what charac-
terizes the structural way we experience the surrounding world in Good Cases.
Despite the initial air of paradox, living through the felt specious present is pre-
cisely what one would expect if visual experience is nothing more or less than a 
demonstration of a skill. Notice, after all, that anything that one successfully and 
skillfully does at a certain time has a similarly irreducible temporal width. “S is 
walking at time t” is a temporally-wide phenomenon: as a competent navigation 
through a space of possibilities, it implies that S was doing something just prior 
to t (getting up from a chair), is doing something now (moving her feet), and will 
be doing something in the immediate future (continuing to walk). I submit that 
this isomorphism is not accidental. It exists because both walking and visually 
experiencing the world are examples of skillful action. Arguably, we live through 
the consciously felt specious present in Good Cases, simply because we are then 
enacting a skill via visual behavior. Just as we might pre-reflectively engage in the 
project of walking across the room, in Good Cases, we pre-reflectively engage in the 
16 The perception-like immediacy of retention drove Husserl to describe it, famously, as just as 
paradoxical as a “wooden iron” (1928/1964, p. 415). 
17 Useful discussion of this primitive kind of bodily awareness can be found in the following places: 
Gallagher (2005); Johnson (1990); Sheets–Johnstone (1999); Wider (1997); Legrand (2007); and 
Maiese (2016).
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project of remotely detecting objects (though, as I explain below, we normally do 
so for larger practical purposes). So, on this view, it is no accident that the specious 
present simultaneously applies to both viewed objects and to our felt bodily behav-
ior. In fact, according to enactivism, this duality is required. We need both forms 
of temporally-wide awareness in order to skillfully visually experience the world.  
To develop the position a bit further, consider the related phenomenon of familiar- 
ity. In the Good Cases in question, we will often experience the world familiarly. 
This is yet another feature that visual experience shares with skills. After all, general- 
ly speaking, a felt sense of familiarity is something that one normally develops along 
with some relevant skill. For example, an experienced artisan will normally be some-
one that is familiar with her craft, where this not only means that she effortlessly 
enacts a skill while she works, but also that the actions feel familiar. If nothing else, 
it seems fair to say that felt familiarity is a phenomenological indication that one is 
then engaged in a skillful act. If so, then, just as the artisan’s feeling of familiarity is a 
sign that she is good at her craft, our felt familiarity with our viewed surroundings 
is a sign that we are good at a project that requires skillful visual behavior. This, I 
submit, is another piece of phenomenological evidence in favor of enactivism. 
That said, there clearly must be more to such visual familiarity than simply 
being good at remotely detecting objects. For one thing, we can pay attention 
to and detect (the properties of) unfamiliar objects. But notice that we do not 
usually look at objects in order to simply detect them, full stop. Instead, skillful 
visual behavior is normally couched within larger practical aims. For example, 
we might look at food in order to eat it. So, although felt familiarity is arguably a 
sign that we’ve become good at detecting certain objects, this is only because that 
skill in turn helps us achieve some larger practical aim. Enactivism thus predicts 
that, developmentally-speaking, my surroundings will not begin to look familiar 
until I engage in behaviors that holistically situate the skillful viewing of those sur-
roundings, in means–ends fashion, within a larger network involving my overall 
norm-guided practice.18 Before the world starts to look familiar, detection must 
first find a home within a larger abstract space of possible desirable interactions. 
A banana will begin to look familiar only after the larger project of, say, finding 
breakfast food has itself become familiar, etc.   
Before developing the way that enactivism explains the specious present further, 
let’s discuss where the classical sandwich’s way of doing so leaves us. Admittedly, 
one thing that might seem to help the naturalized functionalist proponent of the 
classical sandwich is this: at any given time in a Good Case, there is a sense in 
which the already-experienced and anticipated states of both an object and my 
body are present, or at least implicated, in the current experience. A function-
ally autonomous representational process seems well-suited to fulfill the role of 
18 Rowlands (2009) argues that this sort of means–end, goal-oriented normativity of action requires 
a constitutive role for representations in such behavior. I address this below.  
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providing us with this tripartite past, present, and future-oriented sense. On this 
view, a currently activated complex set of neurological processes would stand for 
(reliably indicate) something distinct from themselves (i.e., would be a vehicle for a 
representation). Namely, they would stand for our body’s and some nearby object’s 
past, present, and anticipated behavior. If so, visual representations functionally 
autonomous with respect to proprioception, by themselves, could be plausibly said 
to account for the visual experience of the specious present. In like fashion, repre-
sentational processes could also be posited as what help us go on to develop a sense 
of familiarity with our visible surroundings. This seems to allow us to divorce what 
is essential to conscious visual experience from proprioception, while also account-
ing for the specious present. 
At first glance, this position looks plausible enough. But, to begin to see the 
superiority of enactivism, we can press the following matter: Why would such a 
tripartite representation ever be a part of our cognitive life? For proponents of 
the classical sandwich, the primary purpose of visual experience is to serve as an 
input for downstream cognition and action. One of vision’s main jobs would thus 
be to help to cause (if not also justify) various accurate and/or useful beliefs about 
our surroundings.  In order for it to do its job, vision must of course thereby help 
us gain a sense of the way in which the objects that surround us persist through 
time. But why, then, is the experience of the specious present the particular way 
that vision accomplishes this cognitively significant task? Notice that if vision 
were essentially a representational input for later cognition and action, it could 
cause us to believe in the relative temporal stability of nearby objects even if it only 
gave us a razor thin conscious sense of the present, requiring us to instead gain 
our sense of an object’s persistence, as needed, via reflective acts of recollection 
and prediction. In this imagined alternative phenomenological structure to visual 
consciousness, if we did not consciously reflect on the past and/or likely future 
states of an object, we would continuously experience our surroundings in a way 
that was too temporally compressed for us to retain or anticipate something even, 
say, a half-second removed. But, even in this case, as needed, we still could reflec-
tively gain an accurate and/or otherwise useful picture of reality. Why, then, is 
visual experience not like this? If nothing else, the simple fact that we can ask this 
question shows that in order to adequately explain the specious present, we must 
do more than simply demystify how it is delivered in consciousness. We must also 
plausibly explain why it is so delivered in the first place. 
I think that enactivism is better up to the task. Showing this will take several 
steps. First, without trying to directly discredit the classical sandwich’s way of 
explaining things, I will simply try to show that enactivism is a live option. We 
shall see that what makes my enactivist account of the specious present different 
from its more traditional alternative is how it fails to posit representations. So, in 
other words, my initial aim will simply be to show that nothing about the specious 
present rationally compels us to accept the classical sandwich, or even something 
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sufficiently close to it. After devoting quite a bit of time to this somewhat modest 
aim, I will then argue that enactivism, so understood, better explains the specious 
present. In a word, it does so because it makes the classical sandwich appear, at 
best, ad hoc by comparison. We shall see that not only does enactivism arguably 
adequately explain how the specious present is delivered to consciousness, it also 
better explains why it is so delivered in the first place. 
So, let’s commence with the initial task of showing how enactivism is a live 
option. Baldly put, according to enactivism, the specious present arises because 
the skillful act of seeing something at a certain instant plays the role of priming 
the act of consciously skillfully viewing it at a later time. There are two relevant 
aspects of such priming to consider: first, the sense in which the past skillful act 
primes the present skillful act; and, next, the sense in which the so-primed present 
act itself primes the anticipated future skillful act. On this view, retention occurs 
when the present skillful act of viewing an object has already been primed by 
one’s having just skillfully viewed it. I don’t generally just see a ball as red; instead, 
I see it as, say, remaining red. Arguably, this is only because the skillful experi-
encing of it as red in the immediately preceding moments, involving as it does 
the relevant background proprioceptive awareness, thereby primes and, in that 
sense, automatically so contextualizes my present act of viewing it. If instead I had 
just watched as a white ball was dipped in red dye, I would now experience it as 
becoming red, rather than as remaining red. (Of course, I might act the very same 
way at a certain time, regardless of whether I see the ball as becoming or remain-
ing red. But this only points to the already-noted open-ended nature of optimal 
visual behavior.) The same sort of dependency operates, in turn, with respect to 
the relationship between seeing something at a certain moment and protending 
what is about to happen. The pre-primed act of now looking at an object primes, 
in identical fashion, how I anticipate the skillful act of looking at it will go. Ceteris 
paribus, I will see a ball that’s been sitting on a table in front of me for a while as 
remaining red. This implies both that it just looked red, and also that I anticipate 
a general sort of color that it will look to have in the immediate future. For the 
enactivist, since looking at something red in a Good Case is a skillful act, part of 
what I anticipate must also include the proprioceptive sensations involved in the 
relevant upcoming self-aware sense-act. 
In sum, on this view, to say I am still conscious of my computer’s just past state 
is simply to say that the act of having just viewed it currently primes the act of now 
looking at it. In like fashion, to say that I am already conscious of my computer’s 
anticipated states is just to say that the pre-primed act of now viewing it also primes 
the way I will soon act in order to continue to look at it. To say that we experience 
things in the specious present, then, is just to say that we experience the world in 
this irreducibly skillfully-mediated, desiderative, double-primed fashion. 
To establish enactivism as a live option that contrasts with the classical 
sandwich, I must show how this account can work without positing a role for 
HASANOGLU194
visual representations. To broach the matter, one might ask: The causal proper- 
ties of skillful detecting in Good Cases being acknowledged by all parties, what 
relevance does this have for the question of what is essential to conscious visual 
experience? Might one be able to admit all of the above, and still go on to support 
the claim that the conscious visual detection of a nearby object’s properties is 
essentially a kind of information processing? If so, enactivism would in fact not 
seem to be a very viable option. Instead, we would now seem compelled to accept 
the classic sandwich’s picture of matters. To support this idea, notice that along 
with the fact that it normally involves skillful behavior, vision typically results 
from the operation of several distinct neural pathways, each made up of ensem-
bles of neurons and sensory receptors that only selectively respond to a relatively 
narrow range of stimuli. For example, consciously detecting an object’s color is 
subserved by neural pathways quite distinct from those that subserve consciously 
detecting motion (Kandel and Wurtz, 2000). Therefore, it might seem plausible 
to say that when I have a typical, unified experience of a single colored, moving 
object, this can only be due to how my brain has already synthesized the afore-
mentioned pieces of information. 
However, let’s grant the obvious point that hierarchically organized, complex 
neural activity is essential to conscious visual experience.19 Nothing imme-
diately follows that threatens enactivism. All that this establishes is that such 
neurological activity is part of what is responsible for the conscious visual detec-
tion of various properties of objects. Enactivism remains a live option just as 
long as i) it is still quite possible that more neural activity must be involved, as 
a matter of human psychology; and also ii) we can construe the total sum of 
neural activity in non-representational terms. As for i): if enactivism is right, 
the above-described neural activity is insufficient for producing a conscious 
visual experience sufficiently intrinsically phenomenally similar to typical Good 
Cases. You would also need neural activity that subserves the relevant concur-
rent proprioceptive awareness of one’s skillful visual behavior, as well as that 
which is responsible for producing the relevant desires that initiate and sustain 
such behavior. Notice that it would be quite a tall order for the proponent of the 
classical sandwich to show well enough that, as a matter of human psychology, 
this is not a live option: it would have to be experimentally and/or anecdotally 
confirmed that it is possible to produce a typical-seeming visual experience of 
an actual nearby object, even in the absence of proprioceptive awareness of the 
19 By “hierarchically organized,” I simply mean that what the brain does in certain areas stereotyp-
ically systematically builds on what has already been done in other areas.
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desirable visual behavior needed to view that same object at that time.20 To the 
best of my knowledge, no such confirmation can be found.21 
But now for the tougher task: we must show how it is a live option to construe 
all such neural activity in non-representational terms. Doing so will require quite 
a bit of care. After all, at least in my view, the enactivist would be foolish to deny 
that representations ever play a role in demonstrating skillful visual behavior. The 
sophisticated goals within which skillful visual behavior is typically couched will 
traffic in at least putative examples of representations. Intentionally looking at 
something will often be instrumental for accomplishing a more complex behavior, 
including an action that requires us to already somehow occurrently or else dispo-
sitionally believe (and, in that sense, represent) that things in the world are one way 
rather than another. Sometimes I consciously remember that there’s a sandwich in 
the fridge, and this thought both initially motivates and subsequently guides my 
goal-directed remote visual detection of the fridge handle, as I walk towards it. 
Other times I find myself unconsciously reaching for the so-detected fridge handle 
while I’m hungry or bored, without even consciously considering that I am then 
acting on my memory of the fact that there’s a tasty sandwich in there.  
However, the enactivist can accommodate the role of such representations.  The 
above sorts of beliefs clearly pre-determine a certain skillfully-mediated trajectory 
through the relevant space of possibilities. But, as long as the acts of visual detection 
so-involved proceed in a way that is not similarly pre-determined or otherwise 
representationally constrained, there is no sufficiently compelling reason to see the 
conscious visual experiences themselves as representational in nature. Obviously, I 
only successfully track a fridge handle as I walk toward it at a certain time because I 
believe, say, that there’s food in there. To track the fridge handle at that time is thus 
centrally involved in carrying out a plan. But this can be true even though that act 
of tracking is not itself something that requires first explicitly or implicitly repre-
senting that this behavior is or would be optimal, and/or accomplishes a certain 
goal, and/or makes for a nice plan, etc. 
Generally speaking, whenever a relatively complex action goes well, much 
of what happens is the result of reliably executed bodily movements that we 
nevertheless do not consciously plan, but which instead proceed automatically. 
Arguably, this is because these actions (can) proceed without the mediation of any 
representations, properly so-called. Perhaps, then, optimal tracking behavior is 
something I am instinctually (or else, through conditioning, habitually) disposed 
20 Notice, then, that it would not be enough to merely establish that it is metaphysically possible to 
divorce visual experience from proprioception. Even if one finds this divorce conceivable, that is 
irrelevant. See footnote 8. 
21 The case that perhaps comes closest to falsifying my position is the now famous account of Ian 
Waterman (Cole, 2016). Ian lacks proprioceptive awareness from the neck down, but still has typical 
visual experiences. However, briefly, this case does not straightforwardly threaten my position for 
the simple reason that Ian still has proprioceptive awareness above the neck. 
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to engage in as a living, feeling organism. If so, then it is a live option to suppose 
that the execution of this act (can) proceed(s) without a pre-given conscious or 
subconscious motor plan with a certain representational content.  
Notice that, generally speaking, the relevant kind of behaviors are quite 
common. Setting aside visual experience for the moment, putatively non- 
representationally mediated skillful behaviors of a living organism are quite often 
couched, in means–ends fashion, within larger practical aims. Consider any 
behavior governed solely by the intrinsic dynamics of antagonistic muscle pairs. 
As Loeb and Ghez (2000) write:
When standing still, little or no ankle muscle activation is required to stabilize 
your body over your ankle joints. But consider the problem of trying to stand on 
the deck of a small boat pitching back and forth in the water.  Now you must apply 
large forces rapidly in order to pull the center of mass back from any direction. 
By contracting the ankle muscles before these perturbations occur, you increase 
the stiffness at the joint . . . .  [As a result, when] the body is rapidly thrown in one 
direction, the muscles that normally pull in that direction suddenly shorten and 
their tension drops abruptly, while those that pull one back suddenly lengthen 
and their force increases . . . .  The resulting changes in force are quite large in 
precisely the direction required to keep your balance. Furthermore, these intrinsic 
changes in active force are instantaneous. (p. 689, my emphasis) 
As long as we are first poised with a stiffness that braces us for what is about to 
come, any behavioral response to the rocking of a boat will be instantaneous, 
largely determined solely by the intrinsic dynamics of the antagonistic muscle pairs 
found in our ankles. In this case, our instantaneous behavioral responses to boat 
movements are not mediated by any cortical activity.  This is clearly a case where 
a complex voluntary behavior — keeping myself steady on a topsy-turvy boat — 
is modulated by acts that are themselves governed solely by the laws of physics 
for a dynamical system. Certainly no consciously accessible pre-given motor plan 
with representational content is constitutively involved in the way that we, once 
stiffened, instantaneously respond to various erratic boat movements. Moreover, 
governed as it is solely by the intrinsic dynamics of the system, it would be at best 
ad hoc, and at worst plainly false to suppose it is mediated by a subconscious motor 
plan. Rather than any pre-given plan, the laws of physics intrinsic to the system 
take care of things all by themselves. It’s something that we do, but without a CPU. 
Clearly, then, some skillful behaviors of an organism — that is, some cases of self-
aware sense-acting that involve competently navigating through an abstract space 
of possible interactions with one’s surroundings — can be non-representationally 
governed solely by the intrinsic dynamics of the relevant system. For any skillful 
behavior so-governed, it would be at best ad hoc to therein posit a role for either 
conscious or subconscious representations; and so, there would also be no reason 
to posit a role for a CPU-like brain/CNS. Albeit provisionally, let’s now try to push 
this as far as it will go. 
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In fact, reflexes are another example of a non-representational and yet physical- 
law-abiding process that operates solely according to the intrinsic dynamics of 
the system. Consider the spinal stretch reflex. Extend one of your index fingers. 
Now use your other hand to very lightly pull the index finger back in the wrong 
direction, so that it is slightly hyperextended. When you let go of it, it is very likely 
that your index finger will involuntarily bend towards your palm in an overcom-
pensating fashion.  Even though such a behavior involves a process much more 
complex than the one described above, including as it does an interaction between 
sensory and motor nerves in the spine, it is still putatively non-representational. 
After all, it is realized entirely by the spine and surrounding nerves. Nothing 
supraspinal needs to be activated when such a reflex plays out. Without any physio- 
logically necessary role for stereotypical cortical activity, there is just no place for 
anything we might even want to call “information” to need to go for subsequent 
processing before the relevant action occurs. For that reason, there’s no compelling 
reason to label anything “information” in the first place. Once again, then, plau-
sibly, what is happening here is that the behavior proceeds independently of any 
implementation of a pre-given motor plan with representational content. But, free 
though it is from representations, the connection between stretching a muscle and 
the subsequent contraction is still law-like, ceteris paribus. This is indeed because 
it unfolds solely according to the intrinsic dynamics of the relevant system.
Now for the crucial point. Reflexes are not neurologically realized solely by 
pathways south of the brain stem. So-called long-loop reflexes include cortical 
activity. As Krakauer and Ghez (2000) write:
When a standing human subject pulls on a handle, the sudden postural pertur-
bation elicits a rapid counter-response in the stretched muscle at a latency shorter 
than a simple reaction time but longer than for a spinal reflex . . . .  Such rapid mo-
tor adjustments are mediated mainly by relatively simple transcortical pathways 
through which somatosensory inputs reach the primary motor cortex directly via 
projections from the thalamus or primary sensory cortex. (p. 767, my emphasis)
It would be transparently ad hoc to admit that spinal reflexes do not involve pro-
cessing information, but then cling to the idea that long-loop reflexes do, simply 
because they include cortical activity. And with this empirically informed result in 
place, enactivists have their opening. For, we know that object detection in typical 
cases is continuously governed by (at least) two complementary reflexive behaviors. 
Normal control of gaze continuously requires enacting the vestibulo-ocular and/or 
optokinetic reflex. Discussing the vestibulo-ocular reflex, Goldberg (2000) writes:
Stabilizing the fovea when the head moves requires information about head motion. 
This information can be supplied by the visual system — because the image moves on 
the retina when the eyes move with the head — but this visual processing is relatively 
slow. Instead, the nervous system relies on sensors in the inner ear that detect head motion 
directly. Information on movements of the head and the position of the head relative to 
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gravity is processed by the vestibular system. This information is used by the vestibulo- 
ocular reflex to move the eyes directly without relying on visual information to control the 
movement. (p. 783, my emphasis)   
This passage is instructive for many reasons. First, and perhaps most importantly, 
it shows straightforwardly how object detection in Good Cases is a reflexive 
behavior. 22 Move your head from side to side as you read this, and you will notice 
the reflexive way that your eyes remained trained on these words. This all happens 
instantaneously — very much like the steadying behavior of one’s stiffened ankle 
muscles on a rocky boat.  You are able to read in this case, then, only because the 
visual behavior involved is reflexive. But, quite clearly, the reflexive stabilizing of 
an image while your head is moving is just a special case of a more general capacity 
to keep one’s head and body properly oriented while looking at something. This is 
always automatically and instantaneously going on in Good Cases, whether one’s 
head is moving or not. The act of seeing is thus no less reflexive than any of the 
other cases discussed so far. Thus, we have no more reason to suppose this behav-
ior requires representing something than we did for those previous cases. Next, 
the passage also points towards how, not surprisingly, proprioception is inextrica-
bly involved in ongoing reflexive skillful visual behavior. Sensors that detect head 
motion are required. It would be obvious why, at the conscious level, this would 
normally culminate in ongoing proprioceptive awareness of your head’s position 
while you enacted desirable skillful visual behavior. Lastly, although quite unin-
tentional, the above passage nicely illustrates the ad hoc character of the classical 
sandwich. How is it that a reflex can “use information?” To me, this makes about 
as much sense as saying that my spine “processes information” when I enact a 
spinal stretch reflex. Talk of “information” here is strained, at best. Certainly, if 
nothing else, it is a live option to drop such talk altogether.  
Substantively, then, the enactivist position regarding the role of representa-
tions in skillful visual behavior comes down to this. The only meaningful way 
in which representations play a role in such behavior is through the influence of 
occurrent and/or dispositional beliefs. But, although visual behavior is normally 
motivated by dispositional and occurrent beliefs, the enactivist argues that neither 
one is required for skillful visual behavior. Ontogenetically, this would mean that 
adult-like visual phenomenology develops only after we learn how to properly 
use our eyes, head, neck, etc., but perhaps well before we learn how (or else well 
after we have lost the ability) to think/speak linguistically.23 This predicts that 
22 The optokinetic reflex operates in a roughly similar fashion, but in a way that involves slower head 
movements. The two reflexes thus continuously govern control of gaze in a tandem, complementary 
fashion. For discussion see Goldberg and Hudspeth (2000, pp. 809–810). 
23 This, of course, points to an enactivist view of development. On this view, how we come to gain 
basic conscious visual experiences like those involved in objection detection only after we go 
through a drawn out process of shaping various conditioned reflexes with respect to certain objects, 
but not others. If this can be shown to be governed solely by the intrinsic dynamics of the relevant 
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the crucial role for the brain would be to initiate an infant’s relevant instinctually 
determined interest-driven behavior, within which skillful detection would come 
to be instrumentally couched. It would follow that felt emotions and/or other 
impulses would be instrumental for producing the skills, and hence the experien- 
ces. If this were to hold up, then arguably the only way to stick to the idea that 
skillful visual behavior requires a representation to pre-determine it, would be to 
say that very basic dispositional beliefs are somehow what do so. On this view, the 
full story of what is involved in control of gaze would reveal that there is a relevant 
motor plan pre-determined by dispositional beliefs; it would be these beliefs that 
are somehow processed by the brain when we enact the relevant reflexes. How-
ever, this is clearly somewhat desperate. Employing dispositional beliefs in this 
way seems, predictably by now, rather ad hoc. In my view, it distorts the notion of 
“representation” beyond recognition.24 For notice that if we thought that dispo-
sitional beliefs with representational contents constrained even the reflex-driven 
skillful visual behavior undergone at a very young age, then we would seem forced 
to say that the same is true of a bacterium that skillfully swims towards sucrose. 
But, plausibly, a bacterium could behave in the relevant way (governed by the 
intrinsic dynamics of the relevant system) without there and then making use of 
a dispositional belief that, say, food is up that way. 
Rather than starting with any such beliefs, enactivism claims that a living 
organism begins with the ability to enact certain reflex-oriented, instinct and/or 
habit-driven skills, as a result of its genetic endowment. The organism, then, 
through the course of development, goes on to behave in a way that maps onto an 
increasingly more complex web of affordances that eventually corresponds with 
and culminates in sophisticated means–end voluntary behavior constrained by 
occurrent and/or dispositional beliefs (see Thelen and Smith, 1994). If this turned 
out to be correct, then the only thing acting as an organizer and/or synthesizer 
of information would be the conscious living, feeling organism itself. The brain 
would still be properly seen as playing a central role in development; but, not as 
something that receives and processes representational inputs. Instead, it would 
simply be that which helps a living, feeling, organism behave in a way that maps 
onto the relevant affordances. The brain could do so by initiating the relevant 
instinctual and/or habit-driven behaviors, without doing anything akin to running 
software. Instead, according to the enactivist, a conscious living organism’s ability 
to organize information would be a kind of meta-skill that it (can) develop(s). 
Finally, it is important to see that although developing this meta-skill would 
indeed include learning how to organize information pre-reflectively — through 
system, then enactivism would be experimentally vindicated. For what I see as important steps in 
this direction, see Thelen and Smith (1994).  
24 For a useful discussion of the problematic way that the notion of a representation is often used in 
cognitive science and naturalized philosophy of mind, see Ramsey (2007).
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allowing oneself to be influenced by dispositional rather than just occurrent beliefs 
— this kind of information organizing would be nothing like the sort of subpersonal 
processing that seems friendlier to the classical sandwich. The difference would be 
that, in the case of pre-reflectively conscious information access, the living organism 
would normally be quite capable of accurately reflecting on the fact that they are 
so-constrained. Although it influences us pre-reflectively, the information would be 
accessible because and only because it is expressible, ceteris paribus — it would not 
be subpersonal. Suppose I am unconsciously constrained by my dispositional belief 
that there’s a sandwich in the fridge. Ceteris paribus, this would mean that I could, 
say, if prompted, there and then reflect on the fact that I am now reaching towards 
the fridge handle because I believe there’s food in the fridge. Of course, this opens a 
can of worms. What is it to have such beliefs? How should we individuate them? But, 
details aside, the point at the moment is just that there is no danger here of collapsing 
into a view that is friendly only to the classical sandwich: whatever is involved here, it 
would be nothing like reflecting on, say, the (functional properties of) the activity of a 
set of neural pathways! There would still be no compelling reason for supposing that 
subpersonal processing by my brain was here or at any other time involved.  
To sum up the important preliminary point I have been trying to make: to say 
that visual experience is inextricably goal-directed and desiderative does seem to 
require positing a role for representations as constraints on the complex behavior 
within which skillful visual behavior is normally instrumentally couched. But, for 
all of the reasons given, the enactivist can admit this while also plausibly arguing 
that the so-couched skillful visual behavior involved is not “representational” in 
any theoretically useful sense of that word.  
Of course, one might ask: Even if it turns out that the actions required for 
skillful visual behavior do not require a role for representations, what about the 
conscious visual experiences themselves? There is a vast literature that surrounds 
the intuitive idea that simply having an experience with a sufficiently structured 
visual phenomenal qualitative character either just amounts to a representation, or 
else, say, provides the supervenience base for it.25 The question of what is involved 
in the bodily acts required for skillful detection now being set aside, how is it a live 
option that no representations are involved in the more narrowly circumscribed 
visual experience? What is an enactivist account of phenomenal character? 
To answer these questions, one needs to distinguish possessing intentional-
ity from representing. Intentionality refers to an experience’s aboutness, where 
the object that the experience is about is known as its intentional object. A well-
known move of phenomenologists, however, is to claim that the intentional object 
25 For well-known defenses of the view that phenomenal properties reduce to representational prop-
erties, see Harman (1990); Dretske (1995); Tye (1995, 2000) and Lycan (1996). For defenses of a 
contrary view that says that phenomenal properties are not so reducible, see Peacocke (1983); Block 
(1980) and Shoemaker (2007).
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of an ordinary veridical visual experience is nothing other than the spatiotempo-
ral object(s) in question (Husserl, 1979, p. 305; 1913/1982, pp. 207–208). And, 
in like fashion, if the enactivist is correct in thinking that conscious propriocep-
tive awareness is inextricably involved, then the intentional object of that sort of 
awareness will be one’s physical body. So, what is true is that in Good Cases the 
conscious visual experience obviously has intentional objects; but the enactivist 
will argue that since those objects are just the spatiotemporal items in question, 
intentionality is not at all a case where the conscious experiential process stands 
for something, as it were, by proxy. (Notice that this is quite compatible with the 
idea that complex, hierarchically organized neural activity is essential to visual 
experience.) The (intentional) objects in question are just there as the skillful 
interaction plays out. There is a reason that you consciously visually experience 
tables and chairs in the specious present, but not individual air molecules. Namely, 
unlike tables and chairs, individual air molecules lack the causal properties that 
help give rise to the inextricably proprioceptive bodily interactions that allow 
the project of continuously consciously visually detecting them in desiderative, 
double-primed fashion to become sufficiently competently accomplished, let 
alone familiar. So, what we ought to say is that in Good Cases, conscious visual 
experience is the continuously unfolding process of a living organism’s making 
both its body and the surrounding world intentionally present; including the rele- 
vant past, current, and anticipated states.26 
Arguably, then, it is quite possible to deny that consciously visually experiencing 
an object’s color, shape, and motion in a unified fashion amounts to subconscious 
information processing. Instead, according to the enactivist alternative, to so con-
sciously experience a nearby object it is to have found with one’s body a thing 
outside of oneself that affords the detection of these and other properties that allow 
for skillful viewing to unfold. Although the matter no doubt requires careful subse-
quent investigation, it may turn out that in Good Cases it is the object rather than 
one’s brain that, if you like, “does the work” of unifying color, shape, and motion 
properties.27 Intentionality, on this view, is something I live through because I have 
already, in a sense, achieved it with respect to my Umwelt.  
No doubt there are a lot of further questions we could ask about an enac-
tivist understanding of visual phenomenal character. But recall that my aim so 
far has been somewhat modest: I merely want to show that enactivism is a live 
option for accounting for the specious present. So, with the outline of this account 
more or less securely in place, the main explanatory advantage that enactivism 
has over its rival can now be straightforwardly uncovered. For, recall that the 
task was not only to explain what delivers the specious present to consciousness, 
26 For a similar view regarding how enactivism explains the so-called transparency of normal con-
scious experience as a skillful achievement, see Ward (2015). 
27 As Brooks (1991) famously puts it: “the world serves as its own best model” (p. 145).  
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but also to explain why it is so delivered in the first place. To that end, the reason 
why the double-primed acts governed by the intrinsic dynamics of the relevant 
system (rather than anything properly called information processing) would ever 
occur in the first place is quite straightforward: with them happening automatic- 
ally and relatively instantaneously, the practical function of helping us detect 
objects for various larger purposes becomes much easier to accomplish. An arti-
san probably couldn’t perform his craft as easily if he had to constantly stop and 
reflect on everything he is doing. Similarly, I couldn’t as easily detect objects for 
various larger purposes if my conscious sense of a moment was too temporally 
compressed. In short, the specious present exists, on this view, because so expe-
riencing the world makes life much easier. This is of a piece with the enactivist 
view that visual experience is fundamentally action-oriented, rather than merely 
an input for later cognition and action. 
Of course, what this means should not be overstated. For one thing, nothing in 
principle bars the proponent of the classical sandwich from the following reaction: 
visual experience does indeed play a practical function, but this is only because it 
is essentially an input for later action. The practical function of an input wouldn’t 
change the fact that it is, essentially, an input. But, although far from amounting 
to a knock-down refutation of the classical sandwich, my hope is that by now this 
sounds rather ad hoc.28 To drive home the point, we can examine the basic idea 
discussed in the previous paragraph from a different angle. Arguably, the practical 
utility of vision illustrates why subpersonal processing, properly so-called, couldn’t 
be involved. In brief, it would take too long!  Consider what would happen if keep-
ing ourselves steady on a boat required conscious or even unconscious planning 
on our part, rather than unfolding according to the intrinsic dynamics of one’s 
antagonistic muscle pairs. We’d probably be thrown overboard. I take it that it is 
reaching, at best, to say that what must be really going on here is that the behavior 
is instead governed by a different, faster kind of processing local to the muscles 
themselves. Similarly, suppose we were born without the reflexes that so efficiently 
allow for object detection, and instead had to (subconsciously) process everything. 
In a word, life would be rough. And, as my discussion of the above quote from 
Goldberg illustrates, I would again point out that it is rather ad hoc to say that what 
really goes on here is just a faster kind of processing. To repeat, I don’t quite know 
what it means for a reflex to “use information.” My hope is that this, combined with 
the above outline of an enactivist account of intentionality, shows clearly enough 
why it would be reaching, at best, to continue to maintain a functionalist classical 
28 However, recall that my arguments are only designed to apply to a naturalized functionalist ver-
sion of the classical sandwich. Whether it applies to other versions of the more traditional view, 
such as sense-data, adverbialist, or even certain forms of naïve realism, is not something I’ll address 
here. Moreover, even if what I have said in this paper is correct, whether we should go on to reject 
the classical sandwich altogether is also a quite separate matter. This would require weighing all of 
its theoretical advantages against all of its drawbacks, and comparing these results to enactivism.
ACCOUNTING FOR THE SPECIOUS PRESENT 203
sandwich’s account of such matters. Of course, avoiding sounding ad hoc or other-
wise problematic on this particular score is perhaps a relatively modest advantage 
that enactivism may have over its rival. The fight is far from over.29 But, arguably, it 
is a noteworthy advantage for all that.  
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